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This article identifies four mechanisms (talking continuously; showing commitment to a 
community; strengthening operational focus; and accepting difficult decisions) in Venture 
Capitalist (VC) – Owner Manager (OM) relationships that serve to manage tensions and thus 
avert detrimental situations, namely conflicts. The results enrich the literature on VC-OM 
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“Today they say: ‘Si vis pacem para bellum!’ If you want peace, 
prepare for war. This Congress says in behalf of the people: ‘Si 
vis pacem, para pactum!’ If you want Peace, agree to keep the 
Peace.”  
Bartholdt, R. (1907) in Proceedings of the National Arbitration 
and Peace Congress, New York, April 14 to 17, p.233. 
Introduction   
Cooperation between Venture Capitalists (VCs) and Owner-Managers (OMs) is highly 
desirable (Cable, and Shane 1997), yet a growing body of the VC-OM relationship literature 
highlights the ‘dark side’ of such relationships, particularly conflicts (Brettel, Mauer, and 
Appelhoff 2013; Collewaert 2009; Collewaert, and Fassin 2013; Erikson, and George 2010; 
Higashide, and Birley 2002; Khanin, and Turel 2015; Parhankangas, and Landström 2006; 
Yitshaki 2008; Zacharakis). It is well known that whenever two parties cooperate, there is 
potential for conflict over both the means used and the ends they hope to accomplish (Jehn 
1997; Jehn and Mannix 2001). Despite mechanisms to align interests (for example, stock 
options) and contractual agreements formalizing pre-approved solutions to sensitive topics (for 
example, investors’ agreements), the VC-OM relationship is also subject to conflict (Jog, 
Riding, and Lawson 1991). Conflict emergence and conflict management offer relevant and 
valuable avenues of research inquiry into the ways actors deal with friction. There is a long 
tradition in conflict theory studies of focusing on the links between different conflict types and 
their outcomes (Amason 1996; De Dreu, and Weingart 2003; Deutsch 1990; 1994; 2006; Jehn 
1995; Pondy 1967; Rahim 2002; Thomas 1992; Tjosvold 1998a; 1998b). Accordingly, various 
conflict types (for example relationship conflict, task conflict, and process conflict) can have 
negative or positive outcomes (Jehn, and Bendersky 2003; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999; 
Wit, and Greer 2012). This literature has been applied extensively to the specific context of 
VC-OM relationships to study the link between conflict styles and confidence (Zacharakis, 
Erikson, and George 2010), performance (Higashide, and Birley 2002), exit intentions 
(Collewaert 2012), contractual covenants (Parhankangas, Landström, and Smith 2005) and 
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regrets related to action or inaction (Khanin, and Turel 2015). As advocated by conflict theory, 
these studies collectively demonstrate that affective conflict is detrimental to performance 
whereas task and process conflicts, if moderate and occurring under specific circumstances, can 
benefit performance. In addition, there is evidence that disagreements can have positive impacts 
at low conflict levels, whereas escalation in opposition triggers strong negative emotional 
outcomes (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois III 1997).  However, existing research remains 
unclear when it comes to distinguishing between “mild conflict,” which may prove beneficial, 
and “intense conflict,” which has detrimental consequences (Todorova, Bear, and Weigart 
2014). Conflict intensity is therefore a key issue that warrants further investigation. 
In this paper, conflict is defined as perceived discrepant views of a problem that has 
remained unresolved despite dedicated efforts to do so. Conflict situations between VC and OM 
are therefore characterized by decisions that are made (or not) against the will of the other party. 
In contrast, most of the issues jointly addressed by VC and OM lead to mutually held positions 
that are reached either rapidly or after longer debates. This article therefore considers situations 
of conflict as occupying the high end of a continuum of tension intensity ranging from high 
tension level (conflict) to low tension level (rapid agreement), with a moderate tension level in-
between (agreement after long discussions). This continuum is helpful to clarify that, if all 
tensions between VCs and OMs originate in problems to be addressed collectively, not all of 
them are of a conflictive nature. This conceptualization of conflict increases the distinctiveness 
between critical events that are compatible with collaboration and those leading to the failure 
of the VC-OM relationship.   
The article contributes to research on VC-OM conflicts by clarifying practices and 
processes implemented by interdependent partners to control tension intensity. The paper 
identifies four mechanisms (talking continuously; showing commitment to a community; 
strengthening operational focus; and accepting difficult decisions) within VC-OM 
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relationships that enable both parties to manage tensions and thus avert detrimental situations. 
Our approach is inspired by Simmel’s sociology of conflict (Simmel 1904a; 1904b; 1904c), 
which argues that conflict and cooperation should not be considered opposites. Instead, one 
should consider intermediate levels of tension within relationships as opportunities for 
socialization. Simmel’s work encourages observers to see potential future conflicts as 
incentives to make efforts immediately to preserve peaceful relations. 
The results are based on a case study of a French Private Equity Firm named ALPHA 
(a pseudonym), which offers development capital to growing medium-sized regional 
companies, and of eleven of its ventures. The entrepreneur-investor relationship is analyzed 
after the investor’s decision to invest. We consider both investors’ and entrepreneurs’ points of 
view, and reconstruct the temporal emergence and development of these VC-OM relationships.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the literature on conflict management 
in VC-OM relationships and our theoretical approach to conflict management, inspired by 
Simmel’s framework. Next we describe the research method and the empirical data collected 
for the study. The third section is dedicated to the detailed analysis of the four mechanisms that 
have been identified as contributing to tension management. The empirical results are discussed 
in the fourth section. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are highlighted in the 
conclusion. 
 
Conflicts in VC-OM relationships and Simmel’s contribution  
Inspired by Simmel’s (1904a; 1904b; 1904c) work, the “what is a conflict” sub-section 
provides a definition of conflict grounded in the actors' experience. We then challenge the 
existing conflict typology by arguing that tension intensity is a characteristic dimension of such 
relations that has been largely overlooked. Consideration of tension as a relational experience 
is further explored in the “tension management” subsection. Lastly, the social embeddedness 
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of VC-OM relationships is examined carefully in the “conflict and socially embedded 
interdependencies” section. 
 
What is a conflict? 
The definition of conflict used in most articles dealing with VC-OM relationships 
(Collewaert 2012; Brettel, Mauer, and Appelhoff 2013; Higashide and Birley 2002; Zacharakis, 
Erikson, and George 2010) draws on Boulding (1963) and Jehn (1995). These authors define 
conflict as perceived incompatibilities or the perception that the parties involved hold discrepant 
views. Consequently, these articles do not take into account critics that have invited scholars to 
distinguish between conflict itself and its antecedent conditions (Schmidt, and Kochan 1972; 
Pondy 1967). 
 To complement this definition of conflict, we consider Simmel’s sociology of conflict 
(1904a; 1904b; 1904c). The famous German sociologist defined conflict as a social form: unlike 
Weberian “ideal types,” Simmelian “social forms” are not concepts invented by the researcher 
in the process of sociological analysis; rather, they exist in the actors’ minds. Viewing conflict 
as a “social form” means that human actors have a clear understanding of what conflict is even 
when their relations with other individuals are harmonious. They are able to give examples of 
a conflict even if none is ongoing, and there is no need for a well identified conflict to exist in 
practice for it to influence behaviors, especially when interdependence is high:  
That in very intimate relationships, which control, or at least affect, the whole content of life – 
such, for example, as marriage – no occasions for conflicts emerge, is unthinkable. Never to 
yield to them, but to anticipate them from a distance, to insure against them in advance by 
reciprocal concession, is by no means always an affair of the most genuine and profound 
affinity, […] The perceived insecurity in the basis of such relationships frequently influences 
us, because of our wish to preserve the relationships at all costs, to exercise quite exaggerated 
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unselfishness, and even to use mechanical guarantees of the situation, through avoidance on 
principle of every threatening conflict. Simmel (1904a: 517-518). 
 
One consequence of Simmel’s view of conflict as social form is that social actors are 
quite capable of identifying what a conflict is. Conflict can therefore be defined through 
empirical study. This article shows that venture-capitalists (VCs) and owner-managers (OMs) 
use the word “conflict” only in reference to situations that have gone out of control. Considering 
conflict as a threat present in their minds, VCs and OMs carefully manage situations to prevent 
them from degenerating into uncontrolled opposition. 
Informed by Simmel’s definition of conflict as social form, we introduce a more precise 
definition of conflict. Specifically, conflict consists of perceived discrepant views on a problem 
that failed to be fixed in spite of dedicated efforts to do so. If conflict is viewed as a result of a 
process through which discrepant views have failed to be fixed, there are, in contrast, situations 
when discrepant views can be resolved and agreements settled. We propose to call “tensions” 
situations in which actors acknowledge their discrepant views and make efforts to overcome 
them. Our definitions of conflict and tension imply that the social mechanisms inherent in 
processes, which could lead to conflict if not properly managed, should be considered relevant 
to the conflict literature. 
 
Tension intensity 
Tension level is defined by the time necessary to overcome discrepant views (short or 
long) and by its result (agreement or disagreement). Low tension prevails when a discrepant 
view of a problem is easily fixed by a rapid exchange of views between partners, and moderate 
tension occurs when the discrepant view is fixed through a longer and more demanding process 
of discussion between parties. In both cases, an agreement is reached. In contrast, high tension 
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– i.e. conflict - occurs when actors abandon hope of finding an agreement in spite of dedicated 
efforts to do so. 
This continuum from low to high tension contributes to the literature on conflict in VC-
OM relationships by introducing tension intensity beyond traditional conflict types (Amason 
1996; Bourgeois III 1980; Jehn 1995; Jehn, and Mannix 2001; Rahim 1983a; 1983b). The 
conflict theory approach applied to VC-OM relationships neglects intensity. Other research 
(such as Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois III 1997) argues that a ‘moderate’ level of task 
conflict within management teams can be productive, but without specifying what this 
‘moderate level’ may be. Our goal is to complement existing research regarding tension 
intensity and to extend it to the VC-OM relationship. 
Our research invites scholars and commentators to construe conflict as the extreme point 
of a continuum of tension situations: from low and moderate tension between potentially 
reconcilable viewpoints – which can be beneficial to the relationship – to high tension, that is 
conflicts, which are destructive. Conceptualizing conflicts as one end of a continuum of tension 
intensity increases the distinctiveness between critical events that are compatible with 
collaboration and those leading to the failure of the relationship. Whereas all tension events 
between VC and OM originate in disagreements, not all disagreements are conflictual. In this 
view of the tension continuum, a tension level score can be developed. The present study thus 
complements that of Zacharakis and Erikson (2010) by exploring tension management 
mechanisms not only in situations of declared conflict (high tension), but also across tensions 
of varying intensity. It addresses the issue of ‘how’ tension is managed and invites observers to 
carefully consider the intensity level of tension between partners, and not merely situations of 
conflict. 
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Tension management 
We contribute to the conflict management literature by developing a more precise view 
of how VCs and OMs develop a cooperative style of tension management. Drawing on 
Simmel’s work (Simmel 1904a; 1904b; 1904c), we construe conflict as a force that brings social 
actors together in a relationship. From a Simmelian point of view, conflict anticipation prompts 
mutual attention to the preservation of good relations when tension emerges. Inspired by the 
socializing effect of both declared and anticipated conflicts, this paper contributes to a better 
understanding of the relational processes to handle tensions so that they do not spiral out of 
control with damaging consequences on performance, reputation and partnerships. We argue 
that VCs and OMs develop specific mechanisms to manage tensions, notably to prevent them 
from reaching a high level.  
Conflict management theory (Deutsch 1990; 1994; 2006; Rahim 2002; Thomas 1992; 
Tjosvold, and Weicker 1993; Tjosvold 1998a; 1998b) has developed as a branch of conflict 
theory. It aims at understanding the way in which people deal with conflict when it occurs. It 
suggests that conflict can be a positive force in organizations only if it is managed properly 
(Jameson 1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999; Rahim 2002). Several methods or strategies 
for handling conflict have been considered. Based on Blake and Mouton’s work (1964), a 
taxonomy of conflict-handling modes has been elaborated that distinguishes five different 
modes (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994; Thomas 1992; Rahim 2002): competing, collaborating, 
compromising, avoiding and accommodating. These conflict-handling modes are classified 
according to the underlying dimensions of assertiveness (attempts to satisfy one’s own 
concerns) and cooperativeness (attempts to satisfy others’ concerns). Even if the conflict 
management approach stresses that there is no single best way for managing conflict, and 
advocates for a contingency approach (also called situational approach), some studies (Rahim, 
Magner, and Shapiro 2000; Tjosvold and Sun 2002; Zhang, Cao, and Tjosvold 2011) 
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nonetheless point out that cooperative styles of handling conflict, such as accommodating, 
collaborating or compromising, are correlated with positive outcomes, and non-cooperative 
styles, such as competing or avoiding, are correlated with negative outcomes. Deutsch and 
Tjosvold (Deutsch 1990; 2006; Tjosvold 1998b; 2008) explored the cooperative and 
competitive theory of handling conflict. They clearly show that the cooperative handling mode 
of conflict contributes more positively to organizational effectiveness than a competitive mode 
does. Nevertheless, Tjosvold (1998b; 2008) states that little is known about how cooperative 
goals, rather than competitive ones, can be set before a conflict occurs. One major contribution 
of our article is that it investigates how cooperative relations emerge, and considers how actors 
(OMs and VCs) deal with tensions in their relationships to prevent them from becoming too 
high. We adopt a Simmelian perspective by arguing that actors (VCs and OMs) mainly 
anticipate the possibility of conflict when handling tensions. VCs and OMs dedicate their efforts 
mainly to managing tensions before they develop into conflict. We thus redirect attention from 
conflict management to tension management. 
Our work deepens insights offered by previous conflict studies in the specific context 
of VC-OM relationships (Parhankangas and Landström 2004, 2005, 2006; and Yitshaki 2007; 
Zacharakis, Erikson, and George 2010) by defining tension management mechanisms adopted 
by the two partners. Informed by the conflict management approach, we depart from a conflict 
resolution perspective advocated by Parhankangas (2004, 2005), among others, and propose a 
tension management approach. Parhankangas and Landström (2004) studied how VCs react 
when entrepreneurs fail to live up to their expectations. Mobilizing the theoretical frameworks 
of psychological contract violation (Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl, and Solley 1962; 
Morrison, and Robinson 1997; Rousseau 1995) and of responses to unmet expectations (Farrell 
1983; Hirschman 1970), they underline that VCs are not passive but rather are active problem 
solvers, and that their behavioral attitude is dependent on the type of psychological contract 
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violation. Although they do not use the conflict management literature, they confirm one of its 
important contributions: conflicts can be beneficial for the venture’s performance if it is actively 
handled (by the VCs). Our research adds to this work by precisely documenting the ‘active 
handling’ approach used by both VCs and OMs To better understand tension management and 
the creation of relational rents (De Clercq, and Sapienza 2001; 2006), we develop a relational 
view of tensions including both VC and OM perspectives (as advocated by Zackarakis et al. 
(2010, p. 123) but rarely done in the literature. 
 
Conflict and socially embedded interdependencies 
Relations between VCs and OMs are often considered only through a single actor’s 
point of view (for an exception see notably Collewaert (2012) on Business Angels and 
entrepreneurs). Interdependencies between VCs and OMs are therefore likely to be 
underestimated. The present study addresses a call to further investigate the investor-investee 
dyad (Lockett, Ucbasaran, and Butler 2006) by examining tensions between VCs and 
entrepreneurs in the course of their post-investment relationship. The interdependency of VC 
and OM has long been documented from financial (Admati, and Pfleidere 1994; Casamatta 
2003; Gompers 1995; Kaplan, and Stromberg 2004; Lerner 1995) and non-financial 
perspectives (Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel 2004; Croce, Marti, and Murtinu 2013; Fried, and 
Hisrich 1995; Politis 2008; Sapienza 1992; Sapienza, Manigart, and Vermeir 1996; St-Pierre, 
Nomo, and Pilaeva 2011; Timmons, and Bygrave 1986). It has also been shown that VC-OM 
exchanges are socially “embedded” (Ferrary, and Granovetter 2009; Ferrary 2003; Granovetter 
1983; Sorenson, and Stuart 2001; Uzzi 1996): their behaviors cannot be understood without 
taking into account their social relations with actors in the environment. In contrast, the impact 
of social embeddedness and interdependency on conflict in VC-OM relationships has largely 
been overlooked. An exception is Parhankangas and Landström (2006), who investigated the 
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role of social environment in venture capitalists’ response to entrepreneurs’ unmet expectations. 
They demonstrate that VCs with strong ties to their peers tend to solve problems with their 
portfolio companies in a more active and constructive manner than their isolated colleagues do.  
Considering social embeddedness and interdependencies between parties in conflict is 
one of the main insights of Simmel’s theorization of conflict (Simmel 1904a; 1904b; 1904c). 
Accordingly, conflict can be seen as functional: as a socialization device or a tool to create 
bonds between parties sharing similar interests for common stakes. Consequently, conflict can 
also be seen as a reciprocal relationship in which interdependency between the involved parties 
is a fundamental dimension. In line with Simmel’s view on conflict, the conflict management 
approach (Coser 1956; Jehn, and Bendersky 2003) expresses a concern for the cooperative and 
socializing dimensions of tense or difficult relations. The present article complements the 
literature on conflicts in VC-OM relationships by introducing this Simmelian perspective, 
which explains why socialization may thrive when interdependent actors deal with common 
concerns in tense situations. 
 
Method   
Research design and data collection 
Case studies are particularly relevant when the objective is to analyze processual and 
interdependent mechanisms and to answer a ‘how’ question (Eisenhardt, and Graebner 2007). 
The present case study investigates how entrepreneurs and investors mitigate tensions between 
them. We examine the relationships between one capital investment firm (“ALPHA”) and 
eleven of its ventures. Our research strategy was to use a case study to inductively create 
theoretical propositions (Corbin, and Strauss 1998; Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt, and Graebner 
2007). The repeated mentioning of peace-keeping mechanisms, first by ALPHA investors and 
then by OMs, signaled that it was an important subject of analysis. 
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ALPHA is a French venture capital firm investing in well-established, profitable and 
growing SMEs of all sectors situated within a limited, although historically increasingly large,  
geographical area: western France. Contrary to most large national or international venture 
capital firms, the firm takes only minority shares in ventures and does not set a specific exit 
date in advance. This investment policy (summarized in Table 1) is a result of the VC firm’s 
specific statutory regime that, in the French legal context, allowed it to reduce taxes on value 
added profits and dividends. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Unlike many VCs, ALPHA investors lacked formal power over entrepreneurs, who 
generally owned a majority of their company shares. ALPHA was thus strongly encouraged to 
get along well with the entrepreneurs because they could not easily replace them. Deprived of 
the usual means, described extensively by agency theory scholars, to impose its will on the 
entrepreneur, the VC was in a situation where disagreements had to be solved peacefully and 
harmoniously. Therefore, ALPHA is a case where tension management mechanisms were 
expected to be particularly numerous and refined. This is consistent with the fact that all but 
one interviewee asserted that they had good, or harmonious, relations with their business partner 
(VC or OM). The only notable exception was POLYSTYRENE (a portfolio company 
pseudonym) that, according to both its CEO and ALPHA’s investment managers, constituted a 
case of overt conflict.  
Another reason to study ALPHA was the unusual length of the VC-OM relationships. 
In a Simmelian perspective, in situations where both parties anticipate that the relationship will 
be long, the need for both actors to regulate tensions is particularly strong.  
Finally, access to a wide range of interlocutors also played a role in the choice of 
ALPHA as an adequate field of study. The research team was given the rare opportunity to 
interview all investment managers within ALPHA, allowing for solid data triangulation. In 
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addition, researchers could also contact a sample of eleven entrepreneurs, illustrating ALPHA’s 
portfolio diversity not only in terms of tension levels, but also regarding dates of creation and 
sector.  
 Data collection started in January 2010 with structured interviews of all ALPHA general 
and investment managers. This initial investigation contributed to the construction of a trustful 
relationship between ALPHA members and the team of researchers. During the interviews with 
VCs we explicitly asked our interlocutors to suggest a few company names that they considered 
representative of the spectrum of tensions they faced in their relationships with OMs. Out of 
this list of names, we produced, together with the two ALPHA directors, a short list of twelve 
companies with the explicit aim of including a wide variety of tension levels and diverse 
company size, seniority in the portfolio and sectors. A second series of contacts was then made 
and eleven interviews were conducted between October and December 2010 (see a brief 
description of the companies in Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The CEOs in our sample were all owner-managers, who could be considered 
“entrepreneurs” in that they made their businesses grow by identifying and exploiting 
“entrepreneurial opportunities” (Kirzner 1973). Consequently, we will use the terms 
“entrepreneurs” and “owner-managers” (“OMs”) as synonymous for our purposes. During 
interviews, our questions were designed to clarify how the relationship between the VC and the 
entrepreneur developed in a longitudinal perspective. They concentrated on facts using standard 
courtroom interrogation (for example, “What subject had been under scrutiny?” “When did this 
become an issue?”) and on processes. Interviewees were encouraged to narrate in detail events 
of importance that had occurred over the course of their collaborations with ALPHA. We also 
asked each OM to characterize his or her relation with ALPHA in terms of tension level. OMs 
could answer with some direct knowledge of the situation in other companies because all of 
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them knew other OMs working with ALPHA either through “meeting days” organized by 
ALPHA, or through connections via business unions or via membership in entrepreneur clubs. 
For example, the OM at POLYSTYRENE confirmed that he was undoubtedly the most difficult 
case in the ALPHA portfolio and was unique. In total, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 20 people (nine investors and eleven owner-managers). More than thirty hours 
of interviews were carried out, recorded and fully transcribed.  
 
Data analysis 
Our question was ‘How do entrepreneurs and VC prevent tensions from developing into 
detrimental opposition’? Consistent with a Simmelian approach that considers conflict as an 
inherent element of any intimate relationship, we focused on the mechanisms implemented to 
manage situations of tension.  
We started by analyzing the data collected respectively from the VC and entrepreneur 
groups, and we wrote two monographs in the first quarter of 2011. Based on a thematic coding 
of each interview and on cross-analysis between informants and between firm cases, we looked 
for similar constructs and relationships among cases. This analytical work allowed us to identify 
preliminary patterns of tension mitigation and the existence of critical events.  
In the second step, a list of critical events was established individually by each author, 
then cross-checked and compared, resulting in a final list of 40 critical events (See Table 3). 
This was done in line with the critical incident technique methodology (Chell and Pittaway 
1998; Flanagan 1954; Turcan 2008). However, unlike the critical incident technique, our intent 
was not to study the impact of events on the success or failure of the venture. Therefore, the 
more neutral term ‘event’ was preferred to ‘incident.’ In interviews, such events correspond to 
particular moments in a venture’s life when a phenomenon occurs that is perceived by actors 
as having high tension potential (for example, shareholder exit, disappointing economic results, 
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and investment/divestment from a subsidiary). These are situations where decisions and actions 
are required that might create disagreements. Indeed, tensions cannot be measured 
independently of the persons involved, and our informants were best positioned to identify the 
moments that were most critical in the business partnership.  
For each event, the mechanisms implemented by VCs and entrepreneurs were studied 
in depth. All interviews were coded a second time by each of the authors independently, before 
being crossed-checked, to precisely identify the nature and intensity of the tension management 
mechanisms implemented. The entrepreneurs’ and the VC’s viewpoints on their handling of 
each critical event identified were considered. We used tables to facilitate the analysis (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). For example, relevant interview sections were copied and compared in 
tables presenting, by column, the tension management mechanisms and, by row, the firm names 
and the event numbers. 
Lastly, we developed a score to measure conflict intensity for each event and a set of 
metrics measuring the frequency and relative importance of each mechanism to quantify their 
intensity in the eleven firms under study. A detailed description of the metrics methodology is 
given in the following section.   
The data analysis was an iterative process. We constantly returned to the data, literature 
and theory to refine our emerging concepts. This allowed us to come up with a model of four 
mechanisms implemented to manage tensions and prevent conflicts, with variable levels of 
intensity. 
Results   
Tension management as a breeding ground for cooperation 
Investors and OMs tended to describe their work as almost entirely free of conflicting 
relations. In their view, the word “conflict” was used to refer only to out-of-control situations 
that reach extreme opposition and that preclude the maintenance of a work relationship between 
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VCs and OMs. However, numerous (n = 40) critical events, defined as situations with 
potentially high impact on the venture organization and economic performance, were 
mentioned by informants as revealing several tensions in most of the VC-Entrepreneur 
relationships. These events encompassed tension levels that can be divided into three categories. 
“Low tension” referred to situations in which entrepreneurs and investors faced a critical event 
but rapidly agreed on the adequate decisions and policies. Such a low-tension situation is 
exemplified by the relation between the PUBLIC WORKS Entrepreneur and ALPHA following 
economic difficulties in 2007 (critical event 17, see Table 3). The entrepreneur asked ALPHA 
to waive its priority dividends for a while, to allow the company to transcend this difficult time. 
ALPHA was reluctant at first, but it soon became clear to the two interlocutors that this 
concession was necessary given the situation. “Moderate tension” differs from low tension in 
that contradictory opinions emerged between the two partners but were overcome through a 
somewhat painful negotiation process. Moderate tension typically implied long discussions 
structured around arguments and counterarguments intended to convince the other. Such 
“moderate tension” situations can be illustrated by critical event 23 (see Table 3), when e-
MARKETING also had to ask ALPHA to forgo its dividends following the “dot.com” crisis. 
The issue was settled only after long discussions between the parties. e-MARKETING was 
notably asked to close its R&D department, initially against the entrepreneur’s will, to reach a 
compromise. Lastly, “high tension” or “conflict” refers to situations when decisions were made 
(or not) with explicit disapproval of one of the parties, inducing mutual misunderstanding and 
long-lasting loss of trust. This is the case in critical event 8 (see Table 3), when the 
POLYSTYRENE manager categorically refused to sell his company despite ALPHA’s 
repeated written requests to do so.  
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 Table 3 presents the 40 critical events identified and their respective tension level. It 
shows that only a few of them (n = 5) were high tension events (that is, conflictual), all of which 
referred to the situation in one firm: POLYSTYRENE.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 4 below presents measures of tension levels in the VC-OM relationship. The 
tension score was calculated by giving a value of 1 to events with a low tension level, a value 
of 2 to events with a moderate tension level, and a value of 3 to high tension events. The average 
tension score is the total tension score for a company divided by the number of years in 
ALPHA’s portfolio.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 These results indicate that non-conflicting relationships are not necessarily tension-free. 
Some tension is generally experienced in all VC-OM relationships, although very few evolve 
into conflicts. Conflicts characterized by an escalation of tensions due to long-lasting 
incompatibilities are rare at ALPHA. This can be explained by the notion of 'conflict,' which 
constitutes a “form” in the Simmelian sense: a situation that the involved actors clearly conceive 
with fear, and therefore try to avoid.  
The remaining part of the article explores the mechanisms implemented by VCs and 
OMs to keep tension levels at low and moderate levels during critical events. We argue that 
such mechanisms play an important role in tension regulation because the overall level of 
tension cannot be explained solely by the nature of the critical events. Indeed, critical events 
that are similar in nature often lead to situations with different levels of tension (e.g. critical 
events 9, 27 and 30 in Table 3). Other factors, primarily the mechanisms that we will now 
describe, must therefore explain the differences in tension levels (cf. Tables 3 and 4). 
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Tension management mechanisms 
During our field study, we identified four tension management mechanisms. All four 
mechanisms were activated in almost all VC-entrepreneur relationships with intensity levels 
ranging from “0” to “++” (see Table 5). To assess the intensity of the “talking continuously” 
and “accepting difficult decisions” mechanisms, we assigned each firm a score of “0” for no 
mention of any practice related to the mechanism; “+” when interviewees mentioned practices 
related to that mechanism; and “++” when such practices where mentioned explicitly several 
times, implying that they played a significant role in the partners’ relations. Examples of the 
situations related to the three intensity levels are found in the table illustrating each of these 
mechanisms in the next section.  
To assess the intensity of “strengthening operational focus” and “showing commitment” 
mechanisms, we assigned each firm a score of “+” by default, considering that owner-managers 
were involved both in firm management and in the regional business community as a 
preliminary condition for ALPHA investment. We rated ventures “++” when the owner-
managers strengthened their operational focus when facing difficulties or showed strong 
dedication to regional business associations. Similarly we assigned a “0” to ventures whose 
owner-managers did not increase their commitment to operations during difficulties or showed 
limited interest in local business networks. Again, examples for each intensity level are 
provided in the charts of the next section.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The next four sub-sections present each mechanism illustrated by situations 
exemplifying various implementation intensities. For each mechanism, a table offers a selection 
of three to four examples. Because POLYSTYRENE is the only case of conflict (i.e. high 
tension) within the sample, it has been used as an illustration in each sub-section. The other 
examples were chosen because they convey the variety of practices associated with each 
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mechanism. Finally, the position of ALPHA investors regarding each mechanism is presented 
systematically at the end of each of the four tables.  
Two mechanisms (talking continuously and showing commitment to a community) were 
implemented on a continuous basis, whereas the other two (strengthening operational focus 
and accepting difficult decisions) were mobilized for a limited duration in periods of growing 
tension. When applied together, all four mechanisms constitute powerful means for preventing 
tensions from turning into conflicts. 
 
Talking continuously 
This mechanism consists of demonstrating a permanent and mutual will to communicate about 
the venture. When it is “high,” the flow of information and ideas shared by both parties is 
perceived as uninterrupted. Through this mechanism, entrepreneurs demonstrate efforts to 
communicate openly, without duplicity or restraint, concerning all information VCs require on 
the firm’s current results and future plans. In turn, VCs express their constant readiness to listen 
and provide advice by promptly sharing their evaluation of the situation. Both partners 
continuously confirm their interlocutor’s commitment to nurture the business.  
This flow of information took place along both formal (general assemblies, board of 
directors’ meetings) and informal (spontaneous visits, phone calls or lunches) communication 
channels. Formal and informal channels may complement and supplement each other over time. 
In general, the older the investment, the more informal the interactions (cf. for example e-
MARKETING in Table 6).   
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Talking continuously is a way for the entrepreneur and the VC to avoid “surprises” by 
being updated in real time. This creates a sense of team collaboration and helps keep tension 
levels low. Table 5 shows that the “talking continuously” mechanism was activated in most 
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situations (ten out of eleven with “++/high” or “+/medium” intensity). The only case where 
communication was not considered “continuous” (that is, with a score indicating “0/low”) was 
the conflictual one (POLYSTYRENE).  
 
Showing commitment to a community 
The second tension management mechanism encompasses several empirical elements. First, 
entrepreneurs and investors asserted and praised their participation in a regional community 
composed of SMEs located in the western part of France and of investors specializing in this 
territory (as opposed to national or international VC firms, referred to as “Parisian” or “Anglo-
Saxon”’ firms by VCs and entrepreneurs alike). Entrepreneurs commonly referred to ALPHA 
as a “family” and people they felt “close to.” In addition, entrepreneurs and VCs shared “strong 
ties” (Granovetter 1983), that is, old and regular relations that resemble friendships more than 
strictly professional connections.    
Second, VC and OM demonstrated that they shared similar values, namely a will to 
promote the economic development of the territory and to preserve local jobs. Such aims were 
sometimes given priority over the maximization of the firm’s financial value (see the AD-
PAPERS example in Table 7).  
Third, VC and OM showed concern about their partner’s reputation. Most entrepreneurs 
mentioned and praised ALPHA’s good track record based on the 500 deals signed with SMEs 
in the region over the past 30 years. Both parties endeavored to preserve the partner’s image in 
the community (see the DOORS example in Table 7).  
  The two relationships scoring “0/low” in Table 5 (“Showing commitment” column) 
were firms with head offices geographically more distant from ALPHA headquarters than the 
others. ELECTRIC CORP and WINE were indeed located outside of the core historic region 
of ALPHA’s activity; ALPHA had started doing business there only a few years ago.  
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[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Demonstrating a sense of belonging to the same community helps mitigate tensions. 
Indeed, this stance indicates to a partner that the other partner is aware of their mutual 
dependence in the relationship. In addition, both partners anticipate that they will interact again 
and engage in future deals. By sharing similar values, they make their behavior more predictable 
for the other.  
 
Strengthening operational focus 
This mechanism refers to parallel reinforcing efforts that are implemented – and considered 
relevant – by both parties when sudden economic events occur that threaten the venture (see 
Table 8 for examples). During such critical situations, OMs generally expended diligent and 
visible managerial effort to address the critical issue in a “focused” way. That is, by remaining 
focused on the resolution of immediate concerns without looking for grand solutions that did 
not yield short-term results (see the EXCEPTIONAL TRANSPORT example). Meanwhile, 
VCs supported the entrepreneurs’ actions by giving them quality advice or relevant contacts 
and by demonstrating their availability. 
These parallel behaviors were those each partner considered appropriate to resolve 
difficulties. They consisted in reciprocal expectations and were intensely scrutinized by both 
parties. When one partner observed that the other one was adopting an appropriate stance, the 
tension level remained low. Abiding by expectations was a way for each partner to nurture trust 
in the relationship and prevent tensions from escalating into conflict. In contrast, when one 
considered the other’s behavior as inadequate, anxiety appeared, which triggered tension 
(POLYSTYRENE example).  
Given that it was crucial for both partners to collectively probe ideas and agree on 
solutions, strengthening operational focus was often accompanied by an increase in the 
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frequency of exchanges between entrepreneurs and investors (see FUNERAL example in Table 
8). This mechanism is reinforced by regular contact, as described in the “talking continuously” 
sub-section. Yet strengthening operational focus was substantially different from the first 
mechanism (“talking continuously”) in that the interpretation of the partners’ decisions had an 
immediate effect: collaboration was quickly reinforced or damaged depending on the partner’s 
reaction to dire situations. 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Accepting difficult decisions 
For investors and owner-managers, this mechanism consists of making decisions for the sake 
of the firm’s economic well-being that are opposed to their individual immediate interests or 
desires. Such decisions, characterized by reciprocal concessions and explicit unselfishness, 
signaled the partners’ dedication to the venture and strengthened the relationship while reducing 
tensions.  
 Table 5 shows that this mechanism has a “++/high” or “+/medium” intensity in nine out 
of eleven cases, with a “0/low” score solely for ELECTRIC CORP and PUBLIC WORKS, 
where no situation requiring this kind of decision had occurred.  
 Table 9 presents two illustrative examples (e-MARKETING and FUNERAL) where the 
mutual acknowledgement of the partners’ efforts in favor of the common good reinforced trust 
and kept tensions at moderate levels between both partners. It also shows that the mechanism 
could also be found in the conflictual case (POLYSTRYRENE). Quite remarkably, even in 
open conflict situations, accepting difficult decisions still acted as a mechanism that reduced 
the intensity of conflict. Such measures may not have been sufficient to fully restore the 
situation to normal, but they may have proven useful to prevent further deterioration of the 
relationship into a highly public dispute, for example. 
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[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 When making particularly difficult decisions in which they mitigate their own individual 
interests by taking into account the interests of the other party, entrepreneurs and investors 
demonstrated their loyalty towards their partner. Adopting “reasonable” behavior rather than 
self-interested behavior regulates tensions and prevents them from spiraling into conflict. Both 
parties showed each other that their desire to pursue the relationship was stronger than the 
tensions that may pull them apart. The capacity to listen and to take the other’s interests into 
consideration was a major factor that helped preserve the quality of the relations. This capacity 
was indeed a reciprocal expectation held by both partners. 
 
Discussion  
In this study, we have argued that VCs and OMs exert efforts to keep tension intensity 
at low or moderate levels and to avoid high tension levels with detrimental outcomes.  Tension 
intensity is thus a characteristic dimension of VC-OM relationships. VCs and OMs implement 
tension intensity management through four relational mechanisms: talking continuously, 
showing commitment to a community, strengthening operational focus and accepting difficult 
decisions. In contrast with conflict theory (Amason 1996; De Dreu, and Weingart 2003; 
Deutsch 1990; 1994; 2006; Jehn 1995; Pondy 1967; Rahim 2002; Thomas 1992; Tjosvold 
1998a; 1998b), which has largely informed previous studies of the conflict-related dimension 
of VC-OMs  relationships (Brettel, Mauer, and Appelhoff 2013; Collewaert 2009; Collewaert, 
and Fassin 2013; Higashide, and Birley 2002; Khanin, and Turel 2015; Parhankangas, and 
Landström 2006; Yitshaki 2008; Zacharakis, Erikson, and George 2010), we foregrounded 
tension management and tension intensity and relegated the more traditional conflict type 
approach to the background. We thus departed from classical conflict definition and proposed 
a definition that takes into account the fact that some disagreements can be overcome through 
24 
discussion without detrimental consequences. In contrast with studies that explore the impact 
of different conflict types on various outcomes (Brettel, Mauer, and Appelhoff 2013; 
Collewaert 2012; Higashide, and Birley 2002; Khanin, and Turel 2015; Parhankangas, and 
Landström 2006), we examine how VCs and OMs deal with tensions that appear in their day-
to-day relationships and what kind of mechanisms they implement to handle them. We thus 
document how a cooperative style of tension management is achieved.   
Our key findings are as follows. First, we assert an overall relation of congruence 
between tension management mechanisms and levels of tension between VC and entrepreneurs. 
Table 10 offers a synthesis of the case and suggests that the more mechanisms activated to 
structure the relationship, the lower the tension level. These are not generalizable results but 
rather a clear and strong indication that careful management of the relationship is likely to ease 
tensions.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
The second finding of this study is that “conflict” should be integrated within a 
continuum of tensions. This article sheds new light on an understudied dimension of “conflict”: 
its intensity (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois III 1997; Jehn, and Bendersky 2003). We 
thus challenge the existing conflict typology, as did Khanin and Turel (2015). We therefore 
contribute to the literature on conflict management in VC-OM relationships by empirically 
showing the importance of tension management mechanisms in order to understand the origins 
and consequences of ill-managed cooperation. We also demonstrate that, beyond the nature of 
the conflict—cognitive vs. affective, pacing vs. prerogative (for example Brettel, Mauer, and 
Appelhoff 2013; Higashide, and Birley 2002; Khanin, and Turel 2015; Zacharakis, Erikson, 
and George 2010) —, tension intensity also determines the detrimental vs. beneficial effects of 
tension. As our case study demonstrates, conflicts are unanimously considered by VCs and 
OMs as detrimental. However, so are situations that lack constructive arguments, that is tension. 
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Collaborations so peaceful or harmonious that they are bereft of critical events are commonly 
considered worthless. Talking continuously and strengthening operational focus sometimes 
entail tensions that benefit the venture. In other words, productive interactions are not 
synonymous with frictionless relationships. Preserving conditions for nourished interactions is 
indeed an explicit concern of both VCs and OMs. Following Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and 
Bourgeois III (1997) and Zacharakis, Erikson and George (2010), we suggest that there is an 
appropriate, well-balanced level of tension: neither zero nor too high. Tension that remains at 
low and moderate intensity levels ensures long-term exchanges of ideas without dysfunctional 
consequences, which is key to innovation and success (Stark 2009). Tension also improves the 
quality of decision-making processes by allowing different options to be considered 
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois III 1997). This is the case at e-MARKETING, where 
tension levels were low but where exchanges between the VC and OM did not preclude 
contradictory points of view that were perceived as enriching their mutual understanding of the 
venture’s future.   
“We [OM & VC] had a meeting together two weeks ago, […] among the possible development 
strategies for the company, we think about growing internationally. […] I prepared a business 
plan, a financing strategy and so on and so forth and I asked him [ALPHA VC] about his 
opinion. He may well answer ‘I believe that you are mistaken here and there’ and his point of 
view will be important and useful to me.” (e-MARKETING OM) 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the four mechanisms described in the “results” section are 
used to initiate and maintain this productive level of tension while preventing tension escalation.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Our third finding is that VCs and OMs both actively seek to manage tensions in their 
relationship. This result confirms previous findings on VCs’ active behavior when managing 
tensions with their portfolio of ventures (Parhankangas, and Landström 2004), and extends 
them to entrepreneurs. Adopting both the VC’s and the entrepreneur’s perspective (as 
advocated by studies such as that of Zacharakis, Erikson, and George 2010) provides a better 
understanding of tension management practices as a reciprocal dynamic relying on behavioral 
expectations from both sides. Khanin, and Turel contend that “to prevent conflict escalation or 
the eruption of prerogative conflicts, CEOs could benefit from acting proactively and 
cooperatively in order to improve their rapport with VCs” (2015, p. 957). We extend their 
argument by asserting that both parties are responsible for conflict prevention. Our research 
demonstrates that VCs, like entrepreneurs, constantly try to behave according to their partner’s 
expectations and that these behaviors (described in the four mechanisms identified) are 
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powerful tension management mechanisms. This study notably finds that entrepreneurs 
demonstrate a strengthened operational focus and willingly endorse difficult decisions when 
facing critical events to avoid being perceived by VCs as shirking or opportunists. VCs also 
behave very actively to avoid creating disappointments on the entrepreneur side, which suggests 
that disappointments in the relationship can stem from either partner. The cooperative dynamic 
is reciprocal in the sense that each partner keeps observing the other one and remains 
cooperative as long as the other follows the same path. Some behaviors (such as strengthening 
operational focus and accepting difficult decisions), implemented when critical events occur, 
are clear signals of non-opportunistic behavior from the partner. Other behaviors (like talking 
continuously or showing commitment to a community) fulfill an anticipative function: they 
allow one partner to anticipate that the other one will behave as expected should a critical event 
happen—for example, from the VCs perspective, that the entrepreneur is expected to keep 
sharing information even if the firm’s results deteriorate sharply. “Cooperative goals” 
(Tjosvold, and Weicker 1993; Tjosvold 1998a) are thus not “given” features of partners 
involved in a specific relation but are socially constructed by actors in a diachronic and enduring 
process through the four mechanisms described in the paper.   
Finally, our last finding is that VC-OM tension management practices are, like all social 
relations (Granovetter 1985), deeply embedded in their social context. It is indeed known that 
VCs and entrepreneurs’ behaviors ought to be understood as embedded (Ferrary, and 
Granovetter 2009; Granovetter 1985; Sorenson, and Stuart 2001; Tjosvold, and Weicker 1993). 
This conclusion also applies to VC-OM tension management practices. Our research shows 
how VCs and entrepreneurs are embedded in a dense network of close ties with other VCs and 
local entrepreneurs (that is, they have frequent interactions) and are more inclined to implement 
active tension management behaviors as depicted in our four mechanisms. Such active 
behaviors are motivated by both actors’ anticipation of future investment or general business 
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deals and the will to avoid tarnishing their reputation within the community. By showing 
commitment to their community, VCs and OMs prove the acceptance of their mutual 
interdependence. By talking continuously, strengthening operational focus and accepting 
difficult decisions, they preserve their image of “good” business partner within the community, 
which makes future business opportunities more accessible.  
  
Conclusion  
Our aim was to understand how VCs and OMs control tension intensity in their 
relationships. We thus studied a venture capital firm and eleven of its ventures. We identified 
four mechanisms that are mobilized to manage tensions: talking continuously, proving 
strengthened operational focus, accepting difficult decisions and showing one’s commitment to 
a community. The more these mechanisms are activated to structure the relationship, the lower 
the tension level. Declared conflicts are therefore rare because they constitute a “form” in the 
Simmelian sense: an anticipated situation that the actors try to avoid.  
With regard to generalizability, the main limitation of this research lies in its single-case 
study focus. Further research could test whether the same four mechanisms are to be found 
when the actors’ profiles are different (VCs in other regions, countries, with different 
investment policies, majority shareholders, entrepreneurs in different sectors). Future research 
could also operationalize the metrics related to the implementation level of the identified 
mechanisms in order to conduct a systematic and large sample-based analysis of their 
correlation with the tension intensity levels of VC-OM relationships.  
We enrich the existing VC-OM conflict literature with several contributions. First, we 
introduce a new variable (tension intensity) and consider “conflict” as the highest level on a 
continuum of tensions. We also document how a cooperative style of handling tensions can be 
achieved, and provide evidence of the active role of both parties in managing tensions. 
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Our results can be translated into practical recommendations for VCs and entrepreneurs 
on how to avoid tension escalation. The four mechanisms presented describe behaviors each 
partner should adopt in order to handle tensions effectively, in critical times (strengthening 
operational focus, accepting difficult decisions) as well as in calmer times (talking 
continuously, and showing commitment to a community). If they “want peace,” VCs and 
entrepreneurs should “agree to keep the peace.” Specifically, to avoid detrimental situations, 
they should anticipate conflict and act unselfishly. They should make concessions and prove 
their goodwill to their partner repeatedly, not because of specific and profound affinity, but 
because of an awareness of their mutual interdependency.  
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Table 1 – ALPHA’s investment criteria 
Criteria ALPHA choice 
Investment amount Between €500,000 and €15,000,000  
Average investment time 6 years (with some cases of investments in the same venture over a period of 15-30 years). 
Number of ventures in the portfolio in 2010 150 (500 since the creation of the company) 
Geographical position of targeted ventures The western region of mainland France 
Targeted economic sectors None in particular, although it tends to avoid IT 
Size of targeted ventures Turnover between 5 and 100 million Euros  
Required performance to qualify for investment  Profitable for a few years 
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Table 2 - Description of the eleven firms studied 
Firm Name Business/products 
Date of 
creation 
Dates of ALPHA 
entry in capital 
No. of 
employees CEO type 
ALPHA 
Investment (in 
Euros) 
Capital 
owned 
by the 
CEO 
 (in %) 
Capital 
owned by 
ALPHA 
(in %) 
Capital 
owned by 
mgt. 
 (in %) 
POLYSTYRENE Polystyrene for construction 1977 2001 152 Takeovera 4,940,000 44 28 - 
PUBLIC WORKS Public works (especially sports grounds) 1966 1988 & 2007 250 Founder 721,000 34 11 33 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANS 
Industrial exceptional 
transportation 1995 2006 2400 Founder  13,875,000 51 14.6 10 
N-PRINT Numeric printing 2001 2001 67 Takeover  183,000 55 27 18  
AD-PAPERS Advertising on paper and plastic bags  1976 2003 135 
Transmission 
(2003) 1,379,000 45 44 11 
e-MARKETING Interactive relational marketing 1999 2000 35 Founder  210,000 >50 18.5 - 
DOORS Doors for individual houses 1995 2007 500 Takeover  15,350,000 57 8 10 
ELECTRIC CORP Electric engineering 1991 2008 230 Founder  4,900,000 70 20 10 
FUNERAL Funeral accessories & fashion accessories 1981 1994 & 2002 360 Takeover  1,279,000 52 31 - 
WINE Wine production 1912 2007 80 Transmission (2007) 6,500,000 75 25 - 
HOME DECOR Home decoration goods 1833 1981 & 2002 450 Transmission (2002) 595,000 90 10 - 
Sources: interviews and ALPHA activity reports. 
a Unlike “transmission,” a “takeover” occurs when an entrepreneur buys the company without being a former employee 
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Table 3 – Critical events in VC-OM relationships 
Event Firm Event Year Event description Tension 
Levela 
1 POLYSTYRENE 2002 External Growth – acquisition of A Low 
2 POLYSTYRENE 2003 External growth – acquisition of B + accidental fire in B Low 
3 POLYSTYRENE 2005 External Growth – acquisition of C Low 
4 POLYSTYRENE 2006 External Growth – acquisition of D + restructuring of D Low 
5 POLYSTYRENE 2006 Exit of some individual shareholders Low 
6 POLYSTYRENE 2006 Extension of the main plant Low 
7 POLYSTYRENE 2006 Concentration of the sector + scissors effect between selling prices and costs: takes time for VC and OM agree to stop current projects Moderate 
8 POLYSTYRENE 2006 ALPHA wants to sell its shares urgently– OM refuses High 
9 POLYSTYRENE 2006 ALPHA demands that OM sell a subsidiary – OM refuses High 
10 POLYSTYRENE 2007 Difficult meetings – OM ignores ALPHA’s request to divest High 
11 POLYSTYRENE 2008 Better relations but ALPHA still wants to sell and OM refuses High 
12 POLYSTYRENE 2008 OM wants to change subsidiaries’ names – ALPHA refuses and OM finally abandons this project Moderate 
13 POLYSTYRENE 2010 Results below expectations Low 
14 POLYSTYRENE 2010 OM wants to grow externally - ALPHA refuses High 
15 PUBLIC WORKS 2007 Financial rate of convertible bonds – OM reluctantly agrees to abide by the shareholders’ agreement  Moderate 
16 PUBLIC WORKS 2007 MBO & discussions about the valuation of ALPHA’s shares Low 
17 PUBLIC WORKS 2007 OM wants ALPHA to forgo its dividends for a while – ALPHA accepts Low 
18 EXCEPTIONAL TRANS 2008 New investment round – long debates on exit prices Moderate 
19 EXCEPTIONAL TRANS 2009 Company facing macro-economic crisis requiring cost-killing plans Low 
20 N-PRINT 2004 Disagreement on OM’s remuneration –VC finally accepts Moderate 
21 N-PRINT 2007 ALPHA urged the OM to make an OBO – ALPHA finally gives up Moderate 
22 AD-PAPERS 2005-2008 Legal changes leading to industrial changes Low 
23 e-MARKETING 2002 Dot.com crisis and OM is reluctant to sack the R&D dept. Moderate 
24 DOORS 2007 OM challenges quality of ALPHA feedback on financial reporting Low 
25 ELECTRIC CORP 2009 OM disappointed by a contact given by ALPHA – ALPHA did not 
immediately notice it  
Moderate 
26 FUNERAL 2004 New shareholders ask for new organizational structure  Moderate 
27 FUNERAL 2005-2006 ALPHA demands the sale of a subsidiary, OM is initially reluctant to proceed Moderate 
28 FUNERAL 2006 ALPHA calls for the OM to sell the historic business of the group – OM accepts Low 
29 FUNERAL 2002-2006 OM wants to renegotiate ALPHA’s priority dividends – ALPHA is unwilling Moderate 
30 FUNERAL 2008 ALPHA demands that OM sell a subsidiary – OM accepts Low 
31 FUNERAL 2007-2009 Bad results and firing of OM family members Low 
32 FUNERAL 2011 CEO preparing his succession Low 
33 FUNERAL 2011 Question about the opportunity to participate in an MBI Low 
34 WINE 2007 Recruitment of an accounting chief officer following ALPHA’s 
investment 
Low 
35 WINE 2008 Disagreement between OM and a board member introduced by ALPHA – It takes time before the board member resigns Moderate 
36 HOME DECOR 2002 OM’s succession – negotiation of ALPHA exit and entry tickets Low 
37 HOME DECOR 2005 Strong increases in raw materials prices Low 
38 HOME DECOR 2005 Foreign direct investment – ALPHA is very pushy at first and finally accepts the OM’s decision not to persist  Moderate 
39 HOME DECOR 2006 Need to make a strategic decision triggered by opportunity to become sub-contractor of a big industry player Low 
40 HOME DECOR 2010 External Growth Low 
a Tension levels were assessed by interpreting materials collected during the interviews. We considered critical events that led quickly to a consensus to 
be “low tension events”; those requiring more time to be settled by an agreement as “medium tension events”; and those leading to a decision taken 
despite declared opposition from the partner as “high tension events.”  
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Table 4 - Tension levels across firms 
Name No. of events 
Low 
tension 
Moderate 
tension 
High 
tension 
Tension 
score 
Years in 
ALPHA 
portfolio 
Average 
tension score 
Overall tension 
levela 
POLYSTYRENE 14 7 2 5 26 9 2,9 HIGH 
PUBLIC WORKS 3 2 1 0 4 22 0,2 LOW 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANS 2 1 1 0 3 4 0,75 LOW 
N-PRINT 2 0 2 0 4 9 0,4 LOW 
AD-PAPERS 1 1 0 0 1 7 0,1 LOW 
e-MARKETING 1 0 1 0 2 10 0,2 LOW 
DOORS 1 1 0 0 1 4 0,3 LOW 
ELECTRIC CORP 1 0 1 0 2 2 1 MEDIUM 
FUNERAL 8 5 3 0 11 16 0,7 LOW 
WINE 2 1 1 0 3 3 1 MEDIUM 
HOME DECOR 5 4 1 0 6 29 0,2 LOW 
 40 22 13 5     
a With average tension scores below 1, the overall tension level is considered as low. Scores between 1 and 2 are considered medium, while scores above 
2 are defined as characteristic of high overall tension levels. 
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Table 5 – Tension management mechanisms  
 Used on a permanent basis Used in situations of growing tensions  
 
Talking 
continuously 
Showing 
commitment 
to a 
community 
Strengthening 
operational 
focus 
Accepting 
difficult 
decisions  
Mechanism 
implementation 
levela 
POLYSTYRENE 0 + 0 + LOW 
PUBLIC WORKS + ++ + 0 MEDIUM 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANS ++ + ++ + HIGH 
N-PRINT ++ ++ + ++ HIGH 
AD-PAPERS + ++ ++ + HIGH 
e-MARKETING ++ + ++ ++ HIGH 
DOORS + ++ ++ ++ HIGH 
ELECTRIC CORP + 0 + 0 LOW 
FUNERAL ++ ++ + ++ HIGH 
WINE ++ 0 + ++ MEDIUM 
HOME DECOR ++ + ++ ++ HIGH 
aWe measure mechanism implementation by summing the “+”s attributed to each mechanism: intensity of between 0 and 
≤2 intensity was considered LOW; between 2 <and ≤5 is MEDIUM; and above 5 is HIGH. 
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Table 6 - Illustrations of the “talking continuously” mechanism 
Company Example Mechanism 
implementation level 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANS 
 
Private formal meetings between investors and the executive committee took place every month. 
16 pages of indicators on cash, margins and backlog with accompanying comments were 
transmitted ahead of the discussions.  
“You cannot work with some debt and other people’s money and not care about what they want. 
You must be absolutely transparent about figures.2” 
The OM willingly went beyond communication requirements mentioned, for example, in the 
shareholders’ agreement. 
 
HIGH 
++ 
 
e-MARKETING Regular quarterly reporting was required by the shareholders’ agreement, and gradually 
abandoned in favor of informal face-to-face or phone communication on an irregular but frequent 
basis. 
“In the shareholders’ agreement, it is explicitly mentioned that I must report to them every 
quarter… It is not so formal anymore because we communicate often enough without that … I 
often meet [VC] as we see each other in several different networks.” 
 
HIGH 
++ 
 
ELECTRIC 
CORP 
The OM felt that, with a venture experiencing a 25% increase in annual revenues for several years 
on a booming market, he did not need extensive information or advice from ALPHA. Reporting 
was required every six months. Yet some informal encounters could take place between quarterly 
meetings, as the OM explains: “I sometimes meet [VC] now and then. We get on well together.” 
  
MEDIUM 
+ 
 
POLYSTYRENE At the time of the study, communication between ALPHA and POLYSTYRENE was not as 
casual and friendly as it used to be but took place at set intervals and through formalized channels 
only.  
“We used to call some of our informal meetings ‘board meetings’ by stating afterwards that we 
had held a board meeting to take such and such decisions [...]. Our discussions used to be quite 
informal. Now on the contrary, they [ALPHA] have become very strict on formalism. It is 
unthinkable to have a board meeting without prior invitations and without an agenda.” 
Changes in the mode of cooperation reflected the escalation in tensions between ALPHA and 
POLYSTYRENE. Emails replaced phone calls as it became important for both parties to leave a 
trail or evidence of their interactions.  
LOW 
0 
 
ALPHA VCs tried to keep regular contact with all the OMs they worked with. What was important for 
them was to be confident they could detect difficulties early. A solution was to ask for formal 
reporting at first and then to adapt according to the relationship with the OM. 
“It’s very important at first to get good quality reporting, to structure future exchanges of 
information. If it is not done within the first two years, it is then much more difficult to implement 
in case of trouble.”  
All opportunities to keep in contact were subsequently taken. 
“We send them some articles, when there is something new we give them a phone call. It is not a 
daily relationship but a relationship that we try to manage correctly over time.” 
HIGH 
++ 
 
  
                                                 
2 Original quotations are in French. They have been translated into English in the tables. 
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Table 7 - Illustrations of the “showing commitment to a community” mechanism 
Company Example Mechanism 
implementation level 
N-PRINT The CEO was willing to provide pieces of advice for free to other entrepreneurs in ALPHA’s 
portfolio.  
“I’d personally already helped [ALPHA] in the past. I gave a hand to a venture on a topic that 
I knew well […] That’s how it works, we are a club.”  
He personally benefited from the close relationships between OMs who share the same 
investor. Having a partner in common opened numerous doors and nourished a fruitful network 
of professionals. On a quarterly basis, face-to-face encounters were organized between OMs of 
the portfolio, who got to know each other.  
“ALPHA’s entrepreneurial day is a very nice initiative. They organize it about once per 
quarter. I don’t attend all of them as it would take too much time, though. It is an opportunity 
to present one’s company. There is a nice atmosphere and you get to make connections.” 
 
HIGH 
++ 
 
DOORS At the heart of the 2008-2009 economic crisis, OM made a special effort to preserve the 
reputation of the ALPHA CEO, who had agreed to pay a high price to enter DOORS’ capital.  
“I considered that I had strong commitments toward him [ALPHA CEO]. We made a deal 
together and I consider it my duty to see that he is not losing anything because of it.”  
OM had known ALPHA CEO for more than 10 years. They belonged to the same executive 
managers’ union, and the two men had become friends. The company where ALPHA CEO 
used to work before ALPHA had also invested in DOORS.  
 
HIGH 
++ 
 
AD PAPERS For the OM, it was unacceptable to assert the predominance of his own interest over the 
company’s future.  
“[A national PE investor] offered me the possibility of taking 20% of shares while they took 
control of the remaining capital. They said to me ‘you have five years to boost this firm, then 
we sell it together so that you get some money and retire to do whatever you want.’ As you may 
have guessed already, I wasn’t particularly motivated by the proposal.” 
Being part of the same regional business community and sharing a common attachment to local 
economic networks was sometimes clearly stated as an important criterion for choosing 
investors. 
HIGH 
++ 
 
POLYSTYRENE Between members of the community, having conflicting relations was almost unthinkable for 
the OM. Serious measures of concealment were therefore taken to keep conflicting relations 
away from public attention.  
“[ALPHA] often organizes gatherings between OM. On specific occasions they organize site 
visits and discussions. Until 2005 I used to be invited on a regular basis and I was attending 
some of them. Since 2006, as our crisis dates back to 2006, I have not been invited once.” 
MEDIUM 
+ 
 
ALPHA ALPHA was very active in various business networks from the region and they nurtured their 
contact with local managers as well as local organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, 
professional bodies, business and philanthropic circles etc.  
“Considering ALPHA’s history, it is very unlikely that an OM has never heard about us. When 
we try to contact one of them directly, this explains why they usually are not reluctant to open 
their door and welcome us.” 
This strategy became less effective as distance grow.  
“The further you get from [ALPHA HQ city] the less [ALPHA] is known.” 
HIGH 
++ 
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Table 8 - Illustrations of the “strengthening operational focus” mechanism 
Company Example Mechanism 
implementation level 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
When the firm faced a sharp fall in revenues in 2009 (critical event 19), the reaction of the 
two owner-managers was to postpone external growth plans and to concentrate on measures 
with immediate effects. They also looked for ways to reduce operational expenses and 
sought new commercial contracts. This behavior was greatly appreciated by investors, who 
supported these efforts to tackle immediate challenges at hand.  
“Now, we really are on a strict diet. We are running after savings on a daily basis [...] 
Personally, I am glad we finally have no external growth this year, it is a chance to get back 
to the actual business.” 
HIGH 
++ 
 
HOME DECOR Steady erosion of commercial margins had been impacting the company’s low-end products 
(critical events 38 and 39). ALPHA began intense discussions with the OM about possible 
off-shoring solutions. On this occasion, ALPHA helped the OM—dedicated to solving the 
critical situation but initially reluctant to execute the off-shoring project—to make up his 
mind about what to off-shore and what not to off-shore.  
“At ALPHA they listen and they give advice as well. Five years ago we built a production 
unit in Tunisia. ALPHA really helped us make up our mind regarding the project. […] They 
told us ‘carry on, don’t be afraid, we have feedback from other ventures in such and such 
businesses and they are successful.’ It is reassuring to be supported by ALPHA” 
HIGH 
++ 
 
FUNERAL In critical situations triggered by merger projects and economic difficulties, both partners 
demonstrated a surge in time and energy dedicated to the venture. Interactions took a flexible 
turn and showed the individuals’ commitment.  
“We meet [ALPHA investment manager] every week these days because of the current 
[merger] projects […] I’ve called her once or twice, I’ve already sent her a memo. We keep 
sending each other memos, it is very, very flexible.” 
MEDIUM 
+ 
 
   
POLYSTYRENE The OM wanted to overcome financial difficulties by acquiring a distressed business in a 
new industrial sector (critical event 14). He scrutinized the plan until he was convinced it 
was realistic before mentioning it to his VC, who was taken by surprise by the project, and 
took it as a major breach of confidence. The OM’s plan was considered a mistake by 
investors: in their view the OM was not demonstrating strengthened operational focus but 
was instead getting distracted by fanciful growth projects. ALPHA then refused to grant the 
OM the authorization to proceed.  
 
LOW 
0 
 
ALPHA The VC paid a lot of attention to showing its commitment when contacted by OM or when 
situations became problematic. It knew that on these occasions it needed to show great 
dedication to the venture and be a valuable support to the OM.   
“You get more involved in companies that are asking you for advice and in those where help 
is needed. […] When there are strategic or financial issues... here we are! We give our 
opinion during crises or during business transformations involving large investments, 
mergers, etc. We are present and we talk with the OM.” 
HIGH 
++ 
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Table 9 - Illustrations of the “accepting difficult decisions” mechanism 
Company Example Mechanism 
implementation level 
e-MARKETING 
In 2002, e-MARKETING went through financial turmoil during the dot.com crisis (critical 
event 23). The company needed extra financial liquidity to cope with daily operations. The 
owner-manager found ALPHA unwilling to take part in a new round of financing. ALPHA 
also insisted on the need to cut costs by closing down the firm’s R&D department. Despite 
his initial reluctance, the owner-manager agreed to close his R&D department. ALPHA 
therefore agreed not to cash in its convertible bonds and to postpone the payment of some 
of the financial interest.   
HIGH 
++ 
 
FUNERAL The OM’s brother headed one of the subsidiaries. When the subsidiary’s performance 
started to deteriorate, some thought that managerial problems were to blame. Both partners 
made concessions to solve this critical situation: the OM finally made the painful decision 
to fire his own brother for the sake of the firm. Although the cause of the trouble seemed 
obvious, ALPHA gave the OM time to solve the situation. They merely put him in contact 
with an HR consulting firm, which conducted a management audit and came to the 
conclusion that the brother was the main problem. 
“ALPHA dealt with the issue very delicately because they knew my own brother was 
involved and that it was not an easy decision to make. (…) I owe to [ALPHA VC] the fact 
that this HR consulting company conducted an audit, which involved interviews with a dozen 
key interlocutors. Its conclusion was that my brother was part of the problem. ALPHA never 
said to me ‘you have to fire your brother’.”  
 
HIGH 
++ 
 
POLYSTYRENE Because of explicit disagreement between the OM and ALPHA regarding an external 
growth project (critical event 14), both partners made concessions. Although he could have 
proceeded without his investors’ explicit consent, the OM finally decided not to carry on 
with the acquisition, knowing it would exacerbate opposition. He remained, in his own 
words, “downhearted” but “reasonable.” Despite the open conflict with the OM, ALPHA 
decided not to use their convertible bonds to gain the voting power to fire him. 
 
MEDIUM 
+ 
 
ALPHA ALPHA VCs mentioned the importance of keeping good relationships with the OM even 
during the exit. ALPHA was willing to forgo the maximization of their investment to 
maintain peaceful relations.  
“We won’t sell our shares at a lower price than what we paid initially, we will try to get a 
good NPV, but I want to say that if our NPV is 19.5% and not 20%, we will be very happy 
with it. We will not be ‘greedy’.” 
HIGH 
++ 
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Table 10 – Mechanism implementation level and tension level convergence 
 Tension 
level 
Mechanism 
implementation 
level  
Convergence 
between the 2 
indicators 
POLYSTYRENE HIGH LOW Convergence 
PUBLIC 
WORKS LOW MEDIUM 
Partial 
convergence 
EXCEPTIONAL 
TRANS LOW HIGH Convergence 
N-PRINT LOW HIGH Convergence 
AD-PAPERS LOW HIGH Convergence 
e-MARKETING LOW HIGH Convergence 
DOORS LOW HIGH Convergence 
ELECTRIC 
CORP MEDIUM LOW 
Partial 
convergence 
FUNERAL LOW HIGH Convergence 
WINE MEDIUM MEDIUM Convergence 
HOME DECOR LOW HIGH Convergence 
 
 
